What may prove the final blow to the traditional
western view of the distinctness of human
beings is now coming from new knowledge in genetics, and its implications
for the way scientists classify humans and our nearest ancestors. For many
years, most biologists assumed that humans evolved as a separate branch from
the other great apes, including the chimpanzees and gorillas. This was a
natural enough assumption, given the strength of our belief in how special
we are. More recent techniques in molecular biology have enabled us to
measure quite precisely the degree of genetic difference between different
animals. We new know that we share 98.4 per cent of our DNA with
chimpanzees. This is a very slight genetic difference. It is, for example,
less than that between two deferent species of gibbon, which are separated
by 2.2 per cent; or between the red-eyed and white-eyed vireos, two closely
related North American bird species, the genes of which differ be 2.9 per
cent. More significant still is the fact that the difference between us and
chimpanzees is less than the 2.3 per cent that separates the DNA of
chimpanzees from that of gorillas. In other words, we--not the gorillas--are
the chimpanzees' nearest relatives. And all of the African
apes--chimpanzees, gorillas and humans--are more closely related to each
other than any of them are to orangutans.
On the basis of this discovery, some leading scientists, among them
Richard Dawkins, lecturer in zoology at the University of Oxford, and Jared Diamond,
profess of physiology at the University of California, Los Angeles, have suggested that it
is time to do what Linnaeus lacked the courage to do" change the way in which we
classify ourselves and that other African apes. As we say, Linnaeus classified humans not
only as a separate species, Homo sapiens, but also as a separate genus, Homo,
and even a separate family, Hominidae. That is how things have remained since the
eighteenth century, Our nearest relative, the chimpanzee, is not Homo but Pan
(there are two species, Pan troglodytes and Pan paniscus) while the gorilla
is a separate genus, Gorilla gorilla, and the apes as a whole belong to the family
Pongidae. We now have decisive evidence that this two hundred-year-old categorization had
no basis other than the desire to separate us from other animals All taxonomists agree
that the two species of gibbon belong in the same genus, and the same is true of the
red-eyed and white-eyed vireos. We are closer to the chimpanzees than the different
species of gibbons, or the different species of vireos, are to each other. We are also
approximately as close to the gorillas as these different species are to each other. There
is only one proper conclusion to draw. Since the rules of naming in zoology give priority
to the name that was first proposed, this means that the two species of chimpanzee should
be renamed Homo troglodytes and Homo paniscus, and the gorilla, Homo
gorilla. Or to follow Jared Diamond's more colorful way of putting it. we are 'the
third chimpanzee'.
So we belong to the same family and the same genus as chimpanzees and
gorillas Still, it may be said, we remain a distinct species, and that is enough to allow
us to draw a clear line between human beings and all other animals. It is true that we
remain a distinct species, but how clear is the line that this enables us to draw? Stephen
Clark, professor of philosophy at Liverpool University, and R. I. M. Dunbar, professor of
biological anthropology at University College, London, have both argued recently that the
way in which we divide beings into species does not reflect a natural order of things, or
a reality out there in the world, but rather the subjective judgments of those doing the
classifying. The boundaries between species are not laid down by nature; they reflect our
ways of classifying living thing. We often group together in the same species beings that
look very differentthe Pekinese and the wolfhound, for examplewhile separating
beings that look very alike, as many different species of birds do. As Dunbar puts it:
The biological reality is that the great apes are just populations
of animals that differ only slightly more in their degree of genetic relatedness to you
and me than do other populations of humans living elsewhere in the world. They just look a
bit different to those other populations that we commonly call human, but not
all that different, and by no means as different as, say, spiders do.
So if we cannot interbreed with
chimpanzees, or with half-human, half-chimpanzee beings who can interbreed with
chimpanzee, this is merely due to the deaths of the intermediate types. In any case, why
do we assume that a human being and a chimpanzee could not produce a child? It is true
that there is a difference in the number of chromosomes, chimpanzees having 48 and humans
46. But siamangs and large gibbons-two distinct spices of ape living in Malaysia and
Indonesia--have interbred, despite the fact that they have different numbers of
chromosomes (50 and 44 respectively). So the possibility of human and chimpanzee
interbreeding cannot be ruled out.
| WHO IS A PERSON?
The chapter began with a description of the life of a community, the
non-human nature of which was concealed by my use of the term 'person'. We often use
'person' as if it meant the same as 'human being'. In recent discussions in biometrics,
however, 'person' is now often used to mean a being with certain characteristics such as
rationality and self-awareness. There is a solid historical basis for this use. It is, as
we saw, consistent with the definition given by John Locke in the seventeenth century.
'Person' comes from the Latin 'persona', which initially meant a mask worn by an actor in
a play, and later come to refer to the character the actor played. The word was introduced
into philosophical discourse by the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, who used it to mean the
role one is called to play in life. It was then taken up by early Christian thinkers
grappling with the problem of understanding the doctrine of the trinity--what was the
relationship between God the Father,
God the Son, and
the Holy Ghost. In 325 the
Council of Nicea settled the issue by saying that the trinity is one substance and three
persons. But what was a person? Since neither God the Father nor the Holy Ghost were human
beings, it was evident that a person did not have to be a human being. In the sixth
century the philosopher Boethius confirmed this by defining 'person' as 'an individual
substance of rational nature', a definition subsequently used by Aquinas and other writers
and supplemented by Locke with the element of awareness of one's own existence at
different times and places.
So a person is not by definition
a human being. But the only nonhuman persons Boethius and Aquinas contemplated were
spiritual beings like God and the Holy Ghost. Are the there other, more tangible persons
who are not human? Is the following a description of a person? |
|
She communicates in sign language, using a vocabulary of over 1000
words. She also understands spoken English, and often carries on 'bilingual'
conversations, responding in sign to questions asked in English. She is learning the
letters of the alphabet, and can read some printed words, including her own name. She has
achieved scores between 85 and 95 on the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test.
She demonstrates a clear self-awareness by engaging in
self-directed behaviors in front of a mirror, such as making faces or examining her teeth,
and by her appropriate use of self-descriptive language. She lies to avoid the
consequences of her own misbehavior, and anticipates other' responses to her actions. She
engages in imaginary play, both alone and with others. She has produced paintings and
drawings which are representational. She remembers and can talk about past events in her
life. She under-stands and has used appropriately time-related words like 'before',
'after', 'later', and 'yesterday'.
She laughs at her won jokes and those of others. She cries when
hurt or left alone, screams when frightened or angered. She talks about her feeling, using
words like 'happy', 'sad', 'afraid', 'enjoy', 'eager', 'frustrate', 'made' and, quite
frequently, 'love'. She grieves for those she had lost---a favorite cat who has died, a
friend who had gone away. She can talk about what happens when one dies, but she becomes
fidgety and uncomfortable when asked to discuss her own death or the death of her
companions. She displays a wonderful gentleness with kittens and other small animals. She
has even expressed empathy for others seen only in pictures.
Many people react with skepticism to
such descriptions of a non-human animal. But the abilities of the gorilla Koko described
here are broadly similar to those reported quite independently by observers of other great
apes, including chimpanzees and orangutans. On the evidence presented, there seems little
doubt that Koko is 'a thinking intelligent being that had reason and reflection and can
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places'. So, it
would seem, are many other great apes, and not only those who have learnt a human
language. After spending most of her life observing free-living chimpanzees in the Gumbo
region of Tanzania, Jane Goodall wrote:
Certainly all of us we have worked closely with
chimpanzees over extended periods of time have no hesitation in asserting that
chimpanzees, like humans, show emotions similar to sometimes probably identical to those
which we label joy, sadness, fear, despair and so on... They can plan for the immediate
future. And they clearly have some kind of self-concept.
There are other persons on this planet. The
evidence for personhood is at present most conclusive for the great apes, but whales, DOLPHINS,
elephants, monkeys, dogs, pigs and other animals may eventually also be shown to be aware
of their own existence over time and capable of reasoning. Then they too will have to be
considered as persons. But what difference does it make, whether a nonhuman animal is a
person or not? In one respect, it makes little difference. Whether or not dogs and pigs
are persons, they can certainly feel pain and suffer in a variety of ways, and our concern
for their suffering should not depend on how rational and self-aware they might be. All
the same, the term 'person' is no mere descriptive label. It carries with it a certain
moral standing. Just as, in law, the fact that a corporation can be a person means that a
corporation can sue and be sued, so too, once we recognize a nonhuman animal as a person,
we will soon begin to attribute basic rights to that animal.
According to this, Jesus was an Ape?
jt.
The Pope says that He-himself is a Fish! (avatar)?
1Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death (NEW YORK: St. Martin's
Griffin, MAY 1996) P.176-182. |

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